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the State Engineer, which prevented the State Engineer from enforcing the order. The DOE based its motion on a claim that preemption
precluded compliance with state water law.
The court found that the DOE's preemption claim was without merit; that the DOE's need for the water was not federally mandated; that
due to the arbitrariness of DOE's increasing requests, any immediate
need for the water was self-imposed by the DOE; and that the DOE
could obtain the water it claimed it needed from a nearby well it already had water rights to. The court further found that Congress had
not enacted legislation that preempted Nevada's state water rights.
The court held that the State Engineer's denial of DOE's water permits
was not in violation of the state's water laws and that Nevada was only
responsible for complying with the "reasonable needs" of the DOE "as
described in the Stipulation."
The court found that the DOE's requests exceeded the amounts
originally stipulated by the parties. The court held that the DOE's unexplained and increased demand for water was not a reasonable need
and therefore the State Engineer was not in violation of Nevada water
law by denying the requests. The court held that the State Engineer
acted reasonably in denying the request, that the DOE's demand to use
water was in excess of the agreement, that there was no clear federal
mandate that preempted state water law, and that the DOE's rejection
of the State Engineer's restrictions was unreasonable. The court determined that the DOE did not present evidence or arguments demonstrating that it would prevail in the underlying case, that the DOE
failed to demonstrate the possibility of irreparable injury if the relief
was not granted, that the balance of hardships did not favor the DOE,
and that public interest issues did not weigh in favor of the DOE. The
court held that the DOE did not present evidence that its need for water was necessary given the circumstances. The court determined that
the DOE failed to meet the criteria necessary to justify a preliminary
injunction and denied the DOE's emergency preliminary injunction
motion.
Jacki Lopez
UNITED STATES CLAIMS COURT
Casitas Mun. Water Dist. v. United States, 76 Fed. C1. 100 (2007)
(holding that operating criteria that benefit fish habitat and reduce
the quantity of water a district can divert does not constitute a physical
or per se taking, but rather a regulatory restriction on an owner's use
of property).
Casitas Municipal Water District ("Casitas") is responsible for the
operation of the Ventura River Project ("Project") in Ventura County,
California, on behalf of the United States Bureau of Reclamation
("BOR"). The Project provides water to the county for agricultural,
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municipal, industrial, and domestic uses. Casitas is subject to the rules
and regulations of the BOR for the operation of the Project, and the
California State Water Resources Control Board grants Casitas its right
to the beneficial use of Project water by way of a license subject to specific quantity limitations. In August 1997, the National Marine Fisheries Service ("NMFS") declared the West Coast steelhead trout, which
exists in the Ventura River, an endangered species. After several years
of consultation between the BOR and the NMFS on how to protect and
develop the fish habitat in the river, the NMFS issued a Biological Opinion that revised the Project's operating criteria. These new criteria
imposed increased flow volumes in the river, which in turn meant a
decrease in the amount of water Casitas could divert. Casitas adhered
to the new BOR criteria, but argued that the loss of its right to divert
an additional 3,200 acre-feet annually from the river constituted a Fifth
Amendment physical or per se taking for which they deserved just
compensation.
Casitas filed suit against the United States ("U.S.") in the United
States Court of Federal Claims and sought contract damages and, in
the alternative, argued that the change in operating criteria was a taking. Following an earlier decision that rejected the contract claim, the
U.S. moved for partial summary judgment, and argued that the restrictions at issue did not constitute a physical or per se taking. Rather, the
U.S. argued that the court should analyze the issue as a regulatory constraint on property use and use the test stated in Penn Central Transportation Co. v. New York City to determine if a taking occurred. The U.S.
argued that a physical or per se taking occurs only when the government has physically invaded property or appropriated it for its own or
another's use. Relying on the Supreme Court's decision in Tahoe-Sierra
Preservation Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Regional PlanningAgency, the U.S. argued that restrictions on the use of property that do not deprive an
owner of all economically beneficial use are not categorical takings,
but rather should be analyzed as regulatory takings using the Penn Centralfactors.
In response, Casitas argued that the U.S. regulatory restriction on
the use of water caused a physical or per se taking, because the use of
water determines its value and any interference with that use results in
a total loss of value. Casitas sought to show that what one may consider
a regulatory restriction on land can have a more profound effect on
the use of water, because the water right owner is dispossessed, the
owner loses the right to exclude others, and the government applies
the property to a different use. It was that distinction, Casitas argued,
that led the Supreme Court to find physical or per se takings in the
regulatory restrictions of water.
Relying on Tahoe-Sierra, the court held that the distinction between
a government's physical takeover of property and a government's mere
restriction on the use of property was paramount in determining
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whether a physical or per se taking occurred. As a result, the court
held that the government action did not constitute a physical or per se
taking, and granted the motion for partial summaryjudgment.
Ryan Malarky
STATE COURTS
CALIFORNIA
Concerned McCloud Citizens v. McCloud Cmty. Servs. Dist., 54
Cal. Rptr. 3d 1 (Cal. Ct. App. 2007) (holding that a contingent sales
agreement for spring water, which stipulated that there must be an
environmental review, did not constitute approval of a project).
On October 1, 2003, the McCloud Community Services District
(the "District") approved a proposed agreement with Nestle Waters
North America, Inc. ("Nestle") to purchase and sell up to 1,600 acre
feet of spring water per year for bottling. The agreement set up a
process by which both parties were responsible for designing specific
details of the proposed project. For example, Nestle was required to
pick a site for its bottling plant and the District was responsible for designing a collection system. The agreement would not bind either party until the District completed compliance with the California Environmental Quality Act ("CEQA"), and there existed no possibility of a
challenge under the CEQA.
Concerned McCloud Citizens, an unincorporated citizens group
formed to protect natural and cultural resources in the area, filed a
petition for a writ of mandate. They argued that the agreement should
be vacated because the District failed to conduct an environmental
review pursuant to requirements under CEQA.
The Superior Court, Siskiyou County, granted the request for the
writ of mandate and ordered that part of the agreement be set aside.
The District and Nestle appealed arguing that Concerned McCloud
Citizens lacked standing to challenge the agreement and that compliance with CEQA was not required before the District approved the
agreement.
The Court of Appeal for the Third District of California found that
Concerned McCloud Citizens had standing to bring suit. A state statute barred any person from maintaining an action unless they objected to the project orally or in writing prior to the close of a public
comment period. However, the court held that the statute was not
applicable because the District did not hold a public hearing or allow
for a comment period.
The court, however, held that the agreement between the District
and Nestle did not constitute approval of a project pursuant to CEQA;
therefore, the agreement was not subject to environmental review.

